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A Cheerful Introduction to Forcing and the
Continuum Hypothesis
Kenny Easwaran
This text grew out of a presentation I made in the Berkeley math depart-
ment’s “Many Cheerful Facts” series on November 16, 2005. These talks are
intended to be accessible to most math graduate students, to help them under-
stand important concepts and connections that exist in areas other than the
one(s) in which they are working. In general, these talks presuppose familiarity
with concepts like groups, topological spaces, categories and the like. But in
practice, people giving talks in more “core” areas of the Berkeley department
(like number theory and algebraic geometry) have been known to presuppose
even more material. Since my talk was on a subject very different from any of
this, I tried to presuppose as little as possible about set theory (mainly just a
familiarity with the notation of membership “∈”, subsethood “⊆”, the union
and intersection operations, and the central fact that there is no one-to-one
correspondence (“bijection”) between the elements of a set and its powerset).
In the talk I took advantage of the basic algebraic knowledge of my audience
to ease the discussion of boolean algebras, but since I would like this written
version to be useful to philosophers as well as mathematicians, I have included
two versions of this discussion.
The material I cover here is definitely too technical to cover in full detail
to an audience without a background in set theory. However, the important
technicalities are only relevant for proving certain lemmas that of little interest
for understanding the results. I have explicitly mentioned any point where I
have omitted such a proof - they can all be found in standard references like
[1], [2], and [3]. At many other points, the technicalities are not so complicated
as to warrant leaving them out entirely, but I felt that they would interrupt
the explanation. In these cases, I have made extensive use of footnotes to fill
in details of various arguments. Ideally, the reader should be able to ignore all
the footnotes, and only consult them when she has a particular interest in the
details of particular segments of the argument. This may make the structure of
the document somewhat confusing, but I hope that it makes it easier for people
with different backgrounds to read it. Every exposition of forcing that I have
seen either presumes a fair bit of familiarity with set theory, or omits all the
discussion of how the method works. I hope to fill this gap.
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1 Boolean algebras and partial orders
In this section, I will explain what you need to know about boolean algebras
(including their ordering, and the operations ∧,∨,¬), ultrafilters, and complete
boolean algebras in order to understand the method of forcing. If you are
already familiar with all those terms, just skip to subsection 1.2 to learn a few
facts about separative, atomless partial orders.
1.1 Boolean algebras
1.1.1 The basics
A partially ordered set is a set of elements with a relation x ≤ y that is reflexive,
antisymmetric, and transitive. That is, x ≤ x, and if x ≤ y and y ≤ x then
x = y, and if x ≤ y and y ≤ z then x ≤ z. (A linear ordering, or total ordering,
is a partial ordering with the additional requirement of trichotomy, that for any
x and y either x ≤ y or y ≤ x or x = y.) A boolean algebra is a particular sort
of partially ordered set (or “partial order”, or “poset”, for short). A boolean
algebra must have a maximal and a minimal element, denoted by “1” and “0”
respectively. (That is, for any x, 1 ≥ x ≥ 0.) In addition, every pair of elements
x and y must have a greatest lower bound x ∧ y and least upper bound x ∨ y.
(That is, x ∧ y ≤ x and x ∧ y ≤ y, and if z ≤ x and z ≤ y, then z ≤ x ∧ y; and
dually for x ∨ y.)
Given these requirements, we can see that x ∨ y = y ∨ x and x ∧ y = y ∧ x,
(commutativity) x∨(y∨z) = (x∨y)∨z and x∧(y∧z) = (x∧y)∧z, (associativity)
x ∨ 1 = 1, x ∧ 1 = x, x ∨ 0 = x, x ∧ 0 = 0, and finally x ≤ y iff x ∧ y = x.
We also require that for every x, there is an element ¬x such that x∨¬x = 1
and x ∧ ¬x = 0. Finally, we require that x ∨ (y ∧ z) = (x ∨ y) ∧ (x ∨ z) and
x ∧ (y ∨ z) = (x ∧ y) ∨ (x ∧ z) (distributivity). Using these facts, we can show
that ¬x is unique.1 It is clear that ¬¬x = x, and it is not hard to show that
¬(x∨y) = (¬x)∧ (¬y), and ¬(x∧y) = (¬x)∨ (¬y) (DeMorgan’s Laws).2 Thus,
we can see that x ≤ y iff ¬y ≤ ¬x.3
1.1.2 Ideals and filters, and examples
An ideal is a nonempty, proper subset of a boolean algebra that is closed under
∨ and closed downwards under the order. That is, if x, y ∈ I and z ≤ x then
1If x ∨ y = 1 and x ∧ y = 0, then (x ∨ ¬x) ∧ y = 1 ∧ y = y, so y = (x ∧ y) ∨ (¬x ∧ y) =
0∨(¬x∧y) = ¬x∧y, so y ≤ ¬x. Similarly, (x∧¬x)∨y) = 0∨y = y, so y = (x∨y)∧(¬x∨y) =
1 ∧ (¬x ∨ y) = ¬x ∨ y. Thus, ¬x ∧ y = ¬x ∧ (¬x ∨ y) = (¬x ∧ ¬x) ∨ (¬x ∧ y) = ¬x ∨ z where
z ≤ ¬x, so ¬x ∨ z = ¬x. Thus, ¬x ∧ y = ¬x, so ¬x ≤ y, and by antisymmetry, we see that
y = ¬x.
2((¬x) ∧ (¬y)) ∨ (x ∨ y) = ((¬x) ∨ (x ∨ y)) ∧ ((¬y) ∨ (x ∨ y)) = (1 ∨ y) ∧ (1 ∨ x) = 1 and
((¬x) ∧ (¬y)) ∧ (x ∨ y) = (((¬x) ∧ (¬y)) ∧ x) ∨ ((¬x) ∧ (¬y) ∧ y) = (0 ∧ ¬y) ∨ (0 ∧ ¬x) = 0.
3It is easy to check that if we define x · y = x ∧ y and x + y = (x ∧ ¬y) ∨ (y ∧ ¬x), then
a boolean algebra is a commutative ring with identity such that ∀x(x · x = x). One can also
verify that in any such ring, if we define x ≤ y to mean x · y = x, then the resulting structure
is a boolean algebra. It turns out that x ∧ y = x · y and x ∨ y = x+ y + x · y.
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z ∈ I and x ∨ y ∈ I.4 A filter is just the dual - if x, y ∈ F and z ≥ x then
z ∈ F and x ∧ y ∈ F . It is straightforward to check that 0 is in every ideal but
no filter, and 1 is in every filter but no ideal. Thus, if x is in an ideal (filter),
then ¬x is not in the ideal (filter). If the converse also holds (that is, that if
¬x 6∈ I implies x ∈ I, or similarly for a filter F ), then the set is said to be a
prime ideal, or an ultrafilter.5
For any ideal I, the set {x|¬x ∈ I} is a filter, and vice versa. If I is a prime
ideal, then this set is an ultrafilter, and vice versa.
The natural example of a boolean algebra is a formal language for logic,
where the elements are equivalence classes of formulas rather than formulas
themselves. On any interpretation of such a language, the set of true sentences
forms an ultrafilter, and the set of false ones forms a prime ideal. Given a
collection of interpretations, the set of sentences true on all of them forms a
filter, and the set of sentences false on all of them forms an ideal.
Dually, if we think of the boolean algebra as a set of possible “truth values”
to assign to sentences, and then specify some of them to count as “true”, then
the specified set will be an ultrafilter.
If we have one boolean algebra B and the function f maps it into another
boolean algebra C in such a way that the operations (∧,∨,¬) are all preserved
by the mapping (that is, f(x ∧ y) = f(x) ∧ f(y), and so on), then the set of
elements mapped to 1 forms a filter and the set of elements mapped to 0 forms
an ideal.6 (Any further properties I mention of ideals and 0 naturally gener-
alize to properties of filters and 1, with perhaps a few other obvious changes.)
Conversely, if B is a boolean algebra and I is an ideal, then there is a boolean
algebra B/I (“B modulo I”, or “the quotient of B by I”) with a natural map
f from B to B/I such that f(x) = 0 iff x ∈ I. B/I can be thought of as the
set of equivalence classes of elements of B, where two elements are said to be
equivalent just in case x∧¬y and y∧¬x are both in I. In addition, if g : B → C
and g(x) = 0 iff x ∈ I, then the set of elements in the range of g is isomorphic
to B/I.
Now consider any set S, and its powerset P(S). If we let x ≤ y mean x ⊆ y,
then it is straightforward to see that this is a boolean algebra, with x∧y = x∩y,
x ∨ y = x ∪ y, and ¬x = S \ x. This algebra is said to be a complete boolean
algebra, because every set of elements has a least upper bound (their union)
and a greatest lower bound (their intersection), not just the pairs, as required
for an ordinary boolean algebra.7 In this algebra, the singleton sets {a}, where
4It is easy to verify that this definition of an ideal is equivalent to the ring-theoretic
definition.
5Note that x · ¬x = x ∧ ¬x = 0, so since 0 ∈ I for any ideal, a prime ideal must satisfy
the above requirement. The converse is also true. It’s also easy to see that any such ideal is
maximal, because if x 6∈ I, then ¬x ∈ I, so adding x to I would also put x+ ¬x = 1 into the
ideal. The fact that every prime ideal is maximal can also be recognized by noting that every
element other than 1 is a zero divisor.
6This is just the standard notion of a ring homomorphism, so obviously the kernel is an
ideal.
7This is the same notion of completeness that the reals have - the rationals are such that
any pair of elements has a least upper bound, but the reals have the additional property that
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a ∈ S, are said to be atoms - that is, if x ≤ {a}, then either x = 0 or x = {a}.
Every element has an atom below it, so the algebra is said to be atomic. A
boolean algebra without atoms is said to be atomless.
Let S be an infinite set, and then let I be the collection of its finite subsets.
Then I is an ideal, because the union of two finite sets is finite, and any subset
of a finite set is finite. The quotient P(S)/I will then be an atomless boolean
algebra. This is because if x is non-zero, then it must be an equivalence class
containing some infinite subset of S. (Every finite subset is equivalent to 0 in
the quotient.) If y and z are any two disjoint infinite subsets of x, then neither is
equivalent to either x or 0, because they differ by infinitely many elements from
each. Thus, x is not an atom. This boolean algebra is not complete, because if
we let x1, x2, . . . be countably many disjoint infinite subsets of S, then they have
no least upper bound. Any mutual upper bound x must contain all but finitely
many elements of each of these sets. But if we now let e1 ∈ x1∩x, e2 ∈ x2∩x, . . . ,
then x \ {e1, e2, . . . } is also a mutual upper bound of the xi, but it is distinct
from x (since they differ on infinitely many elements) and is below it in the
ordering (since it is a subset of x). Thus, there is no least upper bound, so the
algebra is not complete.
1.2 Partial orders
When dealing with a boolean algebra B, the partially ordered set that we will
consider is normally B \ {0}. In this partial order or in any other, we define
x ⊥ y iff x and y have no common lower bound - that is, there is no z such that
z ≤ x and z ≤ y. An atomless boolean algebra gives a partial order such that
∀x∃y(y < x), and this is how we define an atomless partial order in general.
One other important fact about boolean algebras is that if x 6≥ y (so that
x ∧ y 6= y) then, since y = (y ∧ x) ∨ (y ∧ ¬x), we see that y ∧ ¬x 6= 0. If we let
z = y ∧ ¬x, then we see that if x 6≥ y then ∃z(z < y and z ⊥ x). This property
holds for all boolean algebras, and if it holds in a general partial order, we call
such a partial ordering “separative”. The idea is that if we think of think of each
element of the partial ordering as a piece of information about how some world
might be (it could be a proposition about the world, or a set of possible worlds,
or could somehow specify such a set), then unless y entails x (in which case
y ≤ x), there is some piece of information z extending y that is incompatible
with x. Any piece of information can be extended to two incompatible pieces
of information. Moving downwards in the partial ordering always corresponds
to getting more information about this possible world, since there are always
other possibilities that are being ruled out.
In an atomless partial order P , we can say that a set D is dense iff
∀p∃q(q ∈ D and q ≤ p),
any bounded, not just finite, set of elements has a least upper bound. In a boolean algebra,
every set of elements is bounded by 1, so to be complete, every set must have a least upper
bound.
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so that every element of the ordering can be “refined”, or “extended”, to get
a further element of the set. We will later be concerned with ultrafilters that
intersect various dense subsets of our boolean algebra. However, it is useful to
note that if P is a partial order that is a dense subset of some boolean algebra B,
andD is a dense subset of P , thenD is also a dense subset ofB. In addition, ifD
is a dense subset of B, then D′ = {x ∈ P |∃y(x ≤ y and y ∈ D} is a dense subset
of P . Thus, P and B are in some senses interchangeable when considering their
collections of dense subsets. In particular, any filter intersecting every dense
subset of one corresponds to a filter intersecting every dense subset of the other.
Such filters play the central role in sections 4 and 5.
The important fact about separative, atomless partial orders is that if P is
such an ordering, then there is a unique complete boolean algebra B such that
P is isomorphic (as an ordering) to a dense subset of B.8
2 The set-theoretic world-view
In set theory, we pretend that there are no objects other than sets.9 This means
that there is the empty set, ∅; the set containing that, {∅}; the set containing
both of those, {∅, {∅}}; and the like. Set theorists identify the empty set with
the number 0, and the other two sets mentioned above with 1 and 2 respectively.
In general, we can let n = {0, . . . , n − 1}, so that the natural numbers have a
canonical representation as sets.
In addition to each of the natural numbers, there is also a set containing
all of them. Mathematicians standardly call this set N, but set theorists call
it ω for technical and historical reasons. Once the natural numbers have been
identified, the integers can be represented as ordered pairs of naturals, rationals
as ordered pairs of integers, and reals as Dedekind cuts of rationals.10 Other
mathematical entities can be represented using similar means, so there really is
no restriction to saying that sets are the only things that exist.
In the universe of sets, every set has a powerset, which is the set of all subsets
of the first set. The powerset of X is symbolized as P(X). If two sets can be
8The construction involves considering the collection of regular open subsets of P under
the order topology. The technical details are unimportant here.
9Some set theorists actually believe this, at least about mathematical objects - they think
natural numbers, vector spaces, schemes, etc. are all just sets of certain sorts. Actually
adopting this attitude is not necessary here - we just need to restrict attention to the sets
alone, if there is anything else.
10Ordered pairs can be represented as sets as follows: (x, y) = {{x}, {x, y}}. With this
identification, we can see that (assuming x and y are distinct) each ordered pair will have one
singleton and one unordered pair as elements. Whichever element is in the singleton is thus
represented as being “the first” of the two. It’s easy to check that with this identification,
(x, y) = (z, w) iff x = z and y = w, even if x = y (since then z will have to equal w).
With this identification, we then represent integers as equivalence classes of ordered pairs
where (n1, n2) = (m1,m2) iff n1 +m2 = n2 +m1 - the equivalence class of the pair (n1, n2)
is then seen as coding the integer n1−n2. The coding of rationals as pairs of integers is more
familiar - p/q is coded by the equivalence class of the pair (p, q), and two pairs are equivalent
just in case p1q2 = q1p2. A Dedekind cut is a set r of rationals such that if q < q′ and q′ ∈ r,
then q ∈ r. Each such cut codes the real that would be the least upper bound of the set.
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put in bijection with one another,11 we will say they have the same cardinality
(|x| = |y|). Some well-known results of Cantor show that no set can be put in
bijection with its powerset, and that the powerset of ω can be put in bijection
with the set of reals.12 Therefore, I will use R to refer to P(ω), since the relevant
issue here is just cardinality.13
Because every set has a powerset, and we know that a powerset has a strictly
larger cardinality than its corresponding set, we know there are infinitely many
infinite cardinalities. Through use of the axiom of choice, we see that any two
infinite cardinalities can be compared, and they can in fact be well-ordered,14
so we can call the infinitely cardinalities in order ℵ0,ℵ1,ℵ2, . . . , where ℵ0 is the
cardinality of the naturals.15 Since we know the reals have a larger cardinality
then ℵ0, and can’t explicitly construct any sets of intermediate size, we might
conjecture that |R| = ℵ1. In fact, this is exactly what Cantor did, and this hy-
pothesis is called the Continuum Hypothesis (CH). The Generalized Continuum
Hypothesis (GCH) states that for every set x with cardinality κ, the powerset of
x, P(x), has cardinality κ+, the least cardinal greater than κ. What I will prove
below is that if the known axioms of set theory (ZFC) are consistent, then so is
ZFC+|R| = ℵα for just about every α, so we cannot prove CH from ZFC.16 The
proof can easily be generalized to show that GCH is violated at any particular
cardinality, not just at ℵ0.
3 Models of set theory
Set theorists (like all logicians) like to formalize their vocabulary. In this case,
the statements of interest can all be built up from sentences of the form x = y
and x ∈ y by use of logical connectives (and, or, not, iff, etc.) and quantifiers
(∀x and ∃x). A typical example is the sentence
∀x∀y(∃z(∀w(w ∈ z ↔ (w = x or w = y))))
11A bijection is just a one-to-one and onto function. A function f : A→ B is a bijection iff
for all x ∈ B there is a unique y ∈ A such that f(y) = x.
12All of this is covered in many places. To see that there is no bijection between S and
P(S), let that bijection be f , and then consider the set {x ∈ S : x 6∈ f(x)}, which can’t be in
the range of the supposed bijection f . To see that the reals and the powerset of the naturals
are equinumerous, pair each set of naturals with the real number whose nth bit in binary is 1
iff n is in the set. Some care is needed for reals that can be represented in two different ways
in binary, like .10000 . . . and .01111 . . . .
13Set theorists often let “R” denote the set of functions from ω to ω, or from ω to 2 for
the same reason, as well as further topological similarities. At any rate, it’s generally worth
double-schecking what a set theorist means when she talks about a real number.
14That is, in any non-empty set of cardinals, there is a unique least element.
15Technically, we’ll need the notion of an ordinal to be able to number all the infinite
cardinalities. In the context of the Axiom of Choice, cardinals are generally identified with
certain ordinals. Thus, they can be well-ordered, so it really does make sense to talk about
“the least” uncountable cardinal. The technical details of this can be found in any book on
set theory, for instance Kunen, ch. 1.
16Clearly, we can’t have α = 0, by Cantor’s theorem. In addition, there are certain other
values for α, like ω, that are ruled out by a result called Ko¨nig’s Theorem, even though both
larger and smaller values are possible.
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This sentence is one of the axioms of ZFC that are taken to be the facts that
we know about the universe of sets. It states that for any sets x and y, the
set {x, y} exists as well.17 Basically anything of set-theoretic interest can be
phrased in this sort of language. Given any sentence φ in this notation, and any
transitive setM (a transitive set is one that contains all elements of its elements,
so if x ∈ y ∈ M then x ∈ M), we can find a related sentence known as φM
where all quantifiers are restricted to M .18 If the above sentence is taken as φ,
asserting that for any sets x and y, {x, y} exists, then the restriction φM asserts
that if x and y are in M , then {x, y} ∈ M as well.19 Once we have defined
φM , we say that M |= φ (in words, “M satisfies φ”, or “M is a model of φ”20)
just in case φM is true. The important point about this relationship is that
Go¨del’s Completeness Theorem guarantees that for any set T of formulas in the
17If you want the gory details, the complete list is as follows. There are other versions of
some of these, and slightly different overall sets. Any good book on set theory will have them
listed somewhere in an early chapter, if not on the first page. Most of the details aren’t too
important here, though they would be for the detailed proofs of the results I mention.
1. Extensionality - ∀x∀y(x = y ↔ ∀z(z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y))
2. Pairing - ∀x∀y(∃z(∀w(w ∈ z ↔ (w = x or w = y)))) - z is called {x, y}
3. Separation schema - ∀x(∃y(∀z(z ∈ y ↔ (z ∈ x and φ(z))))) - y is called {z ∈ y|φ(z)}
4. Union - ∀x(∃y(∀z(z ∈ y ↔ ∃w(z ∈ w and w ∈ x)))) - y is called
S
x
5. Powerset - ∀x(∃y(∀z(z ∈ y ↔ ∀w(w ∈ z → w ∈ x)))) - y is called P(x)
6. Replacement schema - ∀x(∃y(∀z(z ∈ y ↔ ∃w(w ∈ x and φ(w, z))))), for any formula
φ(w, z) such that ∀w∃!z(φ(w, z) - that is, such that for any w there is a unique z
satisfying φ(w, z), so that φ represents a function.
7. Infinity - ∃y(∅ ∈ y and ∀x(x ∈ y → (x ∪ {x}) ∈ y)) - the smallest such y is called ω
8. Foundation - ∀x(∃y(y ∈ x and ∀z(z ∈ x→ z 6∈ y)))
9. Choice - ∀x[(∀y(y ∈ x→ ∃z(z ∈ y))) → ∃f((f : x→
S
x) and ∀z(z ∈ x→ (f(z) ∈ z)))]
In Separation and Replacement, φ is any arbitrary formula with just the stated variables free
that can be written in this language, so those two are actually infinite sets (schemas) of axioms
rather than individual axioms. In Choice, the notation f : x → y is an abbreviation for the
(very long) sentence saying that f is a set of ordered pairs whose first elements are all in x,
second elements are all in y, and such that each element of x is the first element of exactly
one of the pairs.
18The restriction works as follows - ∀xφ(x) becomes ∀x(x ∈M → φ(x)) and ∃xφ(x) becomes
∃x(x ∈M and φ(x)). This works just as one would expect.
19Actually, it states that there is some element of M whose only elements in M are x and
y - but since M is transitive, all elements of z ∈M must be elements of M as well, and since
the restricted axiom states that the only elements of z in M are x and y, we see that z must
in fact be {x, y}.
20The notion of model used here is much like the notion used in model theory, but is not
quite the same. In model theory, instead of just fixing a set and letting the ∈ relation in the
model be the actual ∈ relation, one must specify a set of ordered pairs to stand for the ∈
relation in addition to specifying the domain of quantification. This allows a unified treatment
of models of any sort of theory, not just theories phrased in the language of set theory. In
addition, it allows for the construction of models with “non-standard” natural numbers and
the like. But for our purposes, we must stick with models where ∈ represents the actual
∈ relation, and enough of the relevant results from model theory will carry through. This
restriction to the actual ∈ relationship is why we only consider restrictions to transitive sets
M .
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language of set theory, this set is consistent iff there is some set M such that
M |= T . In particular, if we assume that ZFC is consistent, then there is some
M such that M |= ZFC.21 And the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem guarantees
that in addition, we can find such an M that is countable.
Thus, to show that the consistency of ZFC implies that it can’t prove the
continuum hypothesis, it will suffice to show that if we have a countable tran-
sitive model M |= ZFC then we can construct a countable transitive model
N |= ZFC+ |R| = ℵα. The method used below will also be able to show that a
variety of other hypotheses are undecidable from ZFC, by showing that models
exist of ZFC together with their negations.
Note that these models make a lot of strange claims. For instance, if M is a
countable transitive model of ZFC, then we know that “R is uncountable”M is
true. But this seems strange, because we said the model is countable. It turns
out that what is going on is that there is a set in M that M “thinks” is the set
of all real numbers, but sinceM only has access to countably many sets, it only
knows about countably many real numbers. So this set (which I will call “RM”)
is in fact countable. However, since the sentence “x is countable” is written as
∃f((f : x→ ω) and f is a bijection)
we see that since RM is actually countable, then there is some f that provides
the bijection, but this f is not an element in M . Thus, M “gets the cardinality
wrong”. This means that in general, when talking about cardinalities in a
model (or any other concept that involves implicit quantification, like this),
we will always have to index them with a superscript, as in ℵMα . However,
note that if M ⊆ N , and M |= |x| = |y| then N |= |x| = |y| (assuming we are
actually talking about the specific sets x and y, rather than using model-relative
names like “R”, or “ℵα”), because N has all the bijections that M does. So
larger models can “collapse” certain cardinalities, but they can’t insert new ones
between old ones.
It may seem problematic to base our consistency claims about cardinalities
on results about these models that can get cardinalities so wrong. But Go¨del’s
results show that if some model satisfies “|R| = ℵ17”, for instance, then this
statement is at least consistent, even though the relativized statement talks
about different sets RM and ℵM17 rather than the real ones. Thus, the strategy
described above will be the relevant one - we just need to be careful when naming
infinite cardinalities.
3.1 M [G]
The more specific strategy will be to start with a countable transitive model
M |= ZFC, find some set G that is not in M , and construct the smallest model
21Technically, we can’t guarantee that this set M is transitive. However, using some set-
theoretic trickery (the Reflection Theorem schema), we can guarantee that if T extends ZFC,
then we can find transitive models for arbitrarily large finite subsets of T , and this will allow
the rest of the results to carry through. The details are discussed at greater length in Kunen,
chs. 4 and 6.
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M [G] containing every element of M as well as G. (We will show in section
4 that such a smallest model exists and is unique.) To specify G so that we
have proper control over M [G], we will let P ∈ M be a separative, atomless
partial order (this property is absolute - it can be expressed entirely in terms of
quantifiers ranging over elements of P rather than the whole universe, so P will
actually be a separative, atomless partial order in any model that contains it)
and B be the corresponding complete boolean algebra as described in section
1.2. ThenG will be a “generic” ultrafilter overB. That is, it will be an ultrafilter
such that for every D ∈M , if D is a dense subset of B \ {0}, then G∩D 6= ∅.22
SinceM is a countable model, we can always guarantee that such a G exists.
This is becauseM only contains countably many dense subsets of B, and we can
number these D0, D1, D2, . . . .
23 Since each set is dense, we can find p0 ∈ D0,
and then p1 ∈ D1 such that p1 ≤ p0, and then p2 ∈ D2 such that p2 ≤ p1,
and so on. Using the (countable) axiom of choice, we can fix such a sequence
p0, p1, p2, . . . , and then let G = {x ∈ B|∃i(x ≥ pi)}. Since this set contains
each pi, we see that it intersects every Di. By definition, we can easily see that
G is closed upwards under the ordering. To see that it is a filter, we note that
if x, y ∈ G, then x ≥ pi and y ≥ pj for some i, j. Without loss of generality,
assume i ≤ j, so that x, y ≥ pj. But then x ∧ y ≥ pj , so (x ∧ y) ∈ G and G is a
filter. We also note that the set Dp = {x|x ≤ p or x ≤ ¬p} is a dense subset of
B, and Dp ∈M since it is definable in such a simple way.
24 Therefore, G ∩Dp
is non-empty, so either p or ¬p is in G, so it is an ultrafilter, as desired.
By choosing P properly, we can make M [G] have certain properties. For
making CH false, we will let P be as follows. Let κ be some set such that
M |= (|κ| = ℵα),25 for some α > 1. Let P be the set of finite partial functions
from κ× ω to {0, 1}. That is, each element of P specifies finitely many values
for a κ by ω array of zeros and ones. If p and q are two elements of P , then
we will say that p ≤ q iff q ⊆ p, so that p is a function extending the function
that is q. Note that this ordering goes in the opposite direction from what one
might expect. It is easy to see that this ordering is atomless, because any finite
partial function can be extended to another one just by adding one more zero
or one to the array. And to see that it’s separative, note that p ⊥ q iff there is
some location in the array that one assigns to 0 and the other assigns to 1. So if
x 6≥ y, so x is not an extension of y, then we can find some value that x assigns
and y doesn’t, and produce z by switching that value from 0 to 1 or vice versa,
and letting z agree with y everywhere else. Then x ⊥ z and z < y, as required
for separativity.
Now, notice the following properties ofG. If p, q ∈ P∩G, then since p∧q ∈ G
22This important use of dense subsets is why we switch back and forth between partial
orders and complete boolean algebras. They are equivalent notions as far as genericity goes,
but the partial order is easier to describe, and the boolean algebra makes some of the technical
machinery work more easily.
23Of course, this numbering can only be done externally to the model - inside the model,
the collection of dense subsets is almost always going to be uncountable.
24Specifically, we just use the axiom schema of separation once from P , using φ(x) as“x ≤ p
or x ≤ ¬p”. Future such constructions may require more of the axioms of ZFC.
25If we identify cardinals with appropriate ordinals, then we can just let κ actually be ℵMα .
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and P is dense in B, we see that p 6⊥ q. So we see that any two partial functions
in P ∩G are compatible, so their union specifies some (possibly partial) function
from κ × ω to {0, 1}. Since P is a dense subset of B, we see that every dense
subset of P is a dense subset of B as well. Thus, P ∩ G intersects every dense
subset of P . For any x ∈ κ and n ∈ ω, we see that Dx,n = {p|p(x, n) is defined}
is a dense subset of P , because we can always extend any finite partial function
by a single value to get another finite partial function. Since P ∩ G intersects
each of these sets, we see that the function specified by P ∩G is in fact a total
function fG : κ× ω → {0, 1}. We can thus define the functions Gx : ω → {0, 1}
by letting Gx(n) = fG(x, n). If x, y ∈ κ, then Dx,y = {p|∃n(p(x, n) 6= p(y, n))}
is dense as well, because any finite partial function can be extended by finding
some n for which neither p(x, n) nor p(y, n) is defined, and letting one value be
1 and the other value be 0. But then, since P ∩G intersects each of these sets,
we see that Gx and Gy must in fact be different functions from ω to {0, 1}.26
Therefore, since M [G] is a model containing G, it can define each of these
functions. Each such function corresponds to a subset of ω, so the powerset of
ω must be at least as large as κ. SoM [G] |= (|R| ≥ |κ|). SinceM had a bijection
between κ and ℵMα , we see that M [G] does as well, so M [G] |= (|κ| = |ℵ
M
α |).
So if we can just show that ℵMα = ℵ
M [G]
α , then we will have achieved our goal.
I will do this in section 5, but first I will have to go into more detail about the
construction of M [G].
4 Names and the construction of M [G]
Because G is a generic ultrafilter over some boolean algebra B that M knows
about, it turns out that quite a lot about M [G] will be specifiable just from
information about M . In particular, M will have a “name” for every element
of M [G], and thus will be able to say everything that M [G] will be able to.
However, though each such sentence will have a truth value of either 1 or 0 in
M [G], M will only be able to specify a “truth-value” from B. Sentences receiv-
ing value 0 or 1 are known by M to be determinately false or true, respectively,
in M [G]. For all others, only the logical relations between them are specified,
and not the actual truth-values. But recall from section 1 that an ultrafilter in
B can be seen as a way of specifying which elements are to count as “true”.
It turns out that if we let [[φ]] = p be the “truth-value” that M assigns to p,
then M [G] |= φ iff p ∈ G. (This will be discussed somewhat more in section 5.)
Since there are many different generic ultrafilters G over P , each will give rise
to a slightly different model M [G], and it makes sense that M will have no way
of telling these models apart, since all are equally generic. But the fact that M
can at least say something about the truth-values of sentences in these models
will give enough control to let us show that ℵMα = ℵ
M [G]
α in the case at hand,
26We can also see that each of these functions must be distinct from any function M knows
about. Let F ∈ M be such that F : ω → {0, 1}. Then let DF,x = {p|∃n(p(x,n) 6= F (x)}.
Each such set is dense, and since P ∩G intersects this set, that means that Gx 6= F , so each
of these functions is distinct from each function that M had.
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and to show other relevant facts in other applications of forcing.
So a P -name n ∈ M will be a set of ordered pairs (m, p), such that m is a
P -name, and p ∈ P . This definition looks circular, since it defines a P -name in
terms of P -names, but in fact it is inductive.27 I like to think of such a name
as specifying a set of names of potential elements, together with a “probability”
that each potential element is actually in the set named. Then, once the class
of names has been specified, we can specify how to interpret the names as
particular sets. Given an ultrafilter G over B (and thus a filter P ∩ G over
P ), we will interpret name n as the set nG = {mG|(m, p) ∈ n and p ∈ G}.28
Then, once we have fixed the generic ultrafilter G, M [G] will be just the set
{nG|n ∈M is a P -name}.
As an illustration of what the names are like, I will show that M ⊆ M [G]
and that G ∈M [G]. For the former, I will associate with each element x ∈M a
name xˇ such that xˇG = x for any G whatsoever. Let ⊤ be the greatest element
of B29 and then let xˇ be the set {(yˇ,⊤)|y ∈ x}. Thus, ∅ˇ = ∅, and if 1 = {∅}
then 1ˇ = {(∅ˇ,⊤)} = {(∅,⊤)}, and if 2 = {0, 1} then 2ˇ = {(∅ˇ,⊤), (1ˇ,⊤)} =
{(∅,⊤), ({(∅,⊤)},⊤)}. By a simple induction, one can show that xˇG = x.
Because ⊤ ∈ G for any ultrafilter G, we see that xˇG = {yˇG|y ∈ x}, but by our
induction assumption, we see that yˇG = y, so xˇG = {y|y ∈ x} = x. Thus, every
element of M has a name, so each is in M [G].
To show that G ∈ M [G], consider the name X˙ = {(pˇ, p)|p ∈ P}. We see
that X˙G = {pˇG|(pˇ, p) ∈ X˙ and p ∈ G}. But pˇG = p, and (pˇ, p) ∈ X˙ iff p ∈ P , so
we see that X˙G = {p|p ∈ P and p ∈ G} = P ∩G. But it is easy to reconstruct
G from P ∩G, so G ∈M [G] as well, as desired.30
Now that I have shown that M ⊆ M [G] and G ∈ M [G], it just remains
to be shown that M [G] is a countable transitive model of ZFC, as claimed.31
27In particular, the circularity is not vicious because of the Axiom of Foundation, which
ensures that any chain x0 ∋ x1 ∋ x2 ∋ . . . eventually terminates after finitely many steps. To
know if any set is a P -name, it suffices to know which of its elements, elements of its elements,
and so on, are themselves P -names.
The universe of sets is constructed by letting V0 = ∅, Vα+1 = P(Vα), and Vλ =
S
{Vβ : β <
λ} - every set appears in some Vα (and all successive ones). Similarly, the class of names can
be constructed by letting N0 = ∅, letting Nα+1 be the set of all sets of pairs of elements, one
from Nα and one from B, and Nλ =
S
{Nβ : β < λ}.
28Again, because of the Axiom of Foundation, we see that this circularity is non-vicious -
to interpret a name, we just need to be able to interpret all the names inside of it, and this
process eventually terminates. Once we have interpreted all the names in Nα, this rule tells
us how to interpret the names in Nα+1, and similarly at limit stages.
29In characterizing B as a ring, ⊤ was 1, but I have used a different symbol here to dis-
tinguish ⊤ from the natural number 1. When considering P given above as the set of finite
partial functions ordered under reverse inclusion, ⊤ is the empty function.
30The construction works as follows: G = {x ∈ B|∃p(p ∈ P ∩G and x ≥ p)}. This can also
be done easily within M [G], once we show that it satisfies all the axioms of ZFC.
31At several points I have also claimed that M [G] is “the smallest” model of ZFC extending
M that contains G. But any model extending M contains all the P -names, and a model
containing G “knows how” to interpret P -names (because the details of the interpretation can
be carried out in any model satisfying replacement, separation, and foundation), so it must
contain all their interpretations, and thus it must contain all of M [G]. So I really only need
to show that M [G] is in fact a model of ZFC, and then it will be clear that it is the smallest
such model.
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This proof is not difficult, but it is somewhat tedious. To get the idea, note
that since the interpretation of any name is a set of interpretations of names,
we see that M [G] is a transitive set, as described above. For any transitive set,
it is clear that Extensionality holds in M [G]. Because ωˇ is a name, it is clear
that Infinity holds in M [G]. To see that Pairing holds, note that if x and y
are elements of M [G], then there must be names x˙ and y˙ in M for them. But
then z˙ = {(x˙,⊤), (y˙,⊤)} is a name that denotes their pair. Separation, Union,
and Powerset work approximately the same way, and Replacement needs only a
slight modification of this technique. The only real difficulty is in showing that
both Foundation and Choice hold in M [G], but the proof is uninteresting, so I
omit it here.32
5 Forcing
Now that we have names for all the elements of M [G], we can use the relations
∈ and =, together with logical connectives and quantifiers, to make statements
about M [G] in a language expressible entirely inside M . We will call this lan-
guage the “forcing language” over B. For any such sentence φ that contains no
names (like “∀x∀y(∃z(∀w(w ∈ z ↔ (w = x or w = y))))”), we define M [G] |= φ
as before. But for sentences that contain names, we will need to first interpret
these names relative to G. For instance, if a˙, b˙, c˙ are names in M , then
φ = “∃x(a˙ ∈ x and ∀y(b˙ ∈ y → (x ∈ y or y ∈ c˙)))”
is a sentence in the forcing language. In this case, we will say that M [G] |= φ
just in case
∃(x ∈M [G])(a˙G ∈ x and ∀(y ∈M [G])(b˙G ∈ y → (x ∈ y or y ∈ c˙G)))
With this extension of the satisfaction relation, we can then say that p  φ (in
words, “p forces φ”) ifM [G] |= φ for every generic ultrafilter G such that p ∈ G.
That is, we will say that p  φ just in case knowing that p ∈ G is sufficient to
guarantee that M [G] |= φ. So sticking p into G is enough to force φ to be true
in whatever resulting extension M [G] we end up with.
The amazing and difficult thing to prove is that for every sentence φ, we
can find [[φ]] ∈ B such that p  φ iff p ≤ [[φ]]. In addition, it will be the case
that [[“It is not the case that φ”]] = ¬[[φ]], and [[“φ and ψ”]] = [[φ]] ∧ [[ψ]], and
in general, logical operations on sentences of the language will correspond to
the operations in the boolean algebra. This association justifies calling [[φ]] the
“truth-value” of φ. The ultrafilter G is then seen as specifying which of these
truth-values should be interpreted as actually being true, for the model M [G]
in question.
For every sentence φ in the forcing language, it will be the case thatM [G] |=
φ iff there is some p ∈ G such that p  φ. This fact is what gives M such
32All these proofs can be found in much more detail in any set theory text that discusses
forcing.
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control over M [G] and allows us to show that M [G] doesn’t change too many
cardinalities relative to M . The complete proof of this result is uninteresting
and very long, so I will just refer the reader to Kunen, ch. 6; Jech, ch. 12; or
Bell, ch. 1. 33
Now that we have defined the forcing relation, and know that for every
sentence in the forcing language, if M [G] |= φ then there is some p ∈ G such
that p  φ, then we can establish further facts about M [G]. In the example
described above, we have shown that M [G] |= (|R| ≥ |ℵMα |), and we want to
show thatM [G] 6|= CH. As I said before, it will suffice to show that ℵMα = ℵ
M [G]
α .
We already know that ℵMα ≤ ℵ
M [G]
α , becauseM [G] can only have more bijections
between sets than M , not less. But if ℵMα < ℵ
M [G]
α , then there must be some
β such that M [G] has a bijection between ℵMβ and ℵ
M
β+1. Using the forcing
relation, we will be able to show that this is impossible.
So let κ and κ+ be some sets in M that M assigns cardinalities ℵMβ and
ℵMβ+1. Because M [G] extends M , these sets will be in M [G] as well. By the
countable Axiom of Choice, we know that a union of ℵβ many countable sets
is itself of size ℵβ , and not ℵβ+1, so if we can find some function F ∈ M that
assigns each element of κ to a countable subset of κ+, then the union of these
subsets must leave out some element of κ+. Now, let us assume for the sake of
contradiction that there is some function f ∈M [G] (with name f˙) such that
M [G] |= “f˙ : κˇ→ κˇ+ is a bijection.”
By the facts about forcing, we see that there is p ∈ G such that
p  “f˙ : κˇ→ κˇ+ is a bijection.”
Now, I will define Fp ∈M as a function from κ to subsets of κ+ as follows. For
any y ∈ κ+, we will have y ∈ Fp(x) iff there is px,y ≤ p such that
px,y  “f˙(xˇ) = yˇ”.
Because P is dense in B, we can assume that each of these px,y is an element
of P ⊆ B. But we can see that px,y must be incompatible with px,y′ if y
′ 6= y,
since these conditions both force f˙ to be a bijection, but force it to take different
33To start out, note that if (m, p) ∈ n, wherem and n are names, then p m ∈ n. However,
if (m, p) ∈ n and (m′, p′) ∈ n, then m ∈ n might be true even though p 6∈ G - the reason is
because we might have some q ∈ G such that q ≤ p′ and q m′ = m.
To deal with atomic sentences of the form n = m, note that if p  (∀x(x ∈ n → x ∈ m))
and q  (∀x(x ∈ m → x ∈ n)), then p ∧ q  n = m. With these facts (and some more
trickery), we can do a simultaneous induction to characterize what it takes for p  φ for any
atomic sentence φ. (This definition can be found in any of the references.)
Once we have defined the forcing relation for atomic sentences, a further triple induction
allows us to characterize the relation for all sentences in the forcing language. The important
thing to note is that for dealing with quantifiers, we need to use the fact that B is a complete
boolean algebra (in M) and not just any boolean algebra. To prove the further facts about
truth-values [[φ]] we need to set up a similar triple induction and show that things work out
exactly the same way for this induction as for the forcing relation.
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values at the same point. But any collection of incompatible elements of P must
be countable in M .34 Thus, each of these sets Fp(x) must be countable in M .
Therefore, their union cannot be all of κ+. But because f ∈ M [G] is in fact
a bijection between κ and κ+, we see that for every y ∈ κ+, there is in fact
some x ∈ κ and px,y ∈ G such that px,y ≤ p and px,y  “f˙(xˇ) = yˇ”. Thus,
every element of κ+ is in some Fp(x). This is a contradiction, so our original
assumption (that there was f ∈ M [G] that was a bijection between κ and κ+)
must have been false. Therefore, M [G] has all the same cardinalities as M , as
required, so our earlier construction in fact shows that
M [G] |= |R| ≥ ℵM [G]α
which means thatM [G] falsifies the Continuum Hypothesis as badly as we want.
Therefore, the negation of CH is consistent with ZFC, QED.
6 Other applications
6.1 Making CH true
We can use a different partial order P ∈ M to show that we can make models
where CH is true, in addition to models where CH is false. In this case, we
let P be the set of countable (in M) partial functions from ℵM1 to R
M , and
again we say that p ≤ q iff p is a function extending q. Again, we see that this
order is atomless, because any countable partial function can be extended, and
it is separative, because if p < q, then we can find some value that p assigns
and q doesn’t, and change it to get an incompatible countable partial function
extending q.
Now, just as before, since G is a filter, we see that it defines a partial function
from ℵM1 to R
M . For any x ∈ ℵM1 , we can define Dx = {p|p(x) is defined} to
see that this function is in fact total. Defining Dr = {p|∃x(p(x) = r)} we can
see that this function is a surjection. Thus, M [G] |= |RM | ≤ |ℵM1 |. We already
know that ℵM1 ≤ ℵ
M [G]
1 . So if we can show that R
M = RM [G], then we will see
that M [G] |= CH. To do this, we must show that if f ∈ M [G] is a function
f : ω → {0, 1}, then f ∈M .
So let f˙ be a name in M for f . Choose p ∈ G such that p  f˙ : ωˇ → {0ˇ, 1ˇ}.
Now find a p0 ∈ G forcing the value of f˙ at 0 such that p0 ≤ p. That is, either
p0  f˙(0ˇ) = 0ˇ or p0  f˙(0ˇ) = 1ˇ. Similarly, find p1 ≤ p0 in G forcing the value
of f˙ at 1, and p2 ≤ p1 forcing the value of f˙ at 2, and so on. Then we get a
34This is because elements of P are finite partial functions, and they are incompatible iff
they assign different values to the same input. There is a combinatorial result called the
“∆-system lemma” (see Kunen or Jech) that states that for any uncountable collection of
finite sets, there is an uncountable subcollection such that any pair of them has the same
intersection, and we call this intersection the “root” of the ∆-system. But if any two of these
functions are incompatible, they must disagree somewhere in the root (because if they disagree
only elsewhere, then they are in fact compatible). But there are only finitely many sets of
values that can be assigned on the root, so the original collection of pairwise incompatible
elements must have been countable.
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descending sequence of elements of P that force f˙ to be a function from ω to
{0, 1} and together force all of its values. Since these are a descending sequence
of countable functions, their union is itself a countable function, so call this
element of the order q. (This is why we had to use countable partial functions,
rather than finite partial functions as before.) Now, since q ∈ M and f˙ ∈ M ,
and q forces every value of f˙ , we see that M “knows how” to read off all the
values of f˙ from q. That is, a single element of the partial order was sufficient to
specify it, rather than needing the entire ultrafilter. So the function f must be
in M as well as in M [G]. Therefore, RM [G] = RM , as required, so M [G] |= CH.
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